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From 1945 to 1979, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was responsible for 
identifying and prosecuting Nazi collaborators and potential war criminals in the United States.  
It failed in this task for a number of reasons.  The first of these was that the agency was severely 
disorganized and mismanaged.  Reliance on interagency cooperation, lack of manpower and 
resources, and lack of institutional support for “Nazi hunters” posed further problems.  Morale 
crises among employees and the legal difficulties of actually prosecuting Nazi collaborators also 
hampered the agency’s effectiveness.  Most importantly, the agency was overwhelmingly 
focused on policing the southern border and preventing the entry of unauthorized Mexican 
migrants.  This policy focus prevented resources from being devoted to other initiatives, 
including investigating the presence of Nazi collaborators in the United States. 
In this paper I analyze the existing historiography on this topic and discuss its shortcomings.  
These include a focus on the small number of cases prosecuted by the INS, from which 
historians have tended to make inapplicable generalizations, and a focus on the Cold War and 
anticommunism as explanations for the INS’s failure.  I have also surveyed historical works on 
denazification in Germany, which I argue provide a better template for historians working on the 
collaborator presence in the United States. 
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 In May 1979, after years of congressional pressure and repeated lackluster performances 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Department of Justice created the 
Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to “identify, and to seek removal of…those who assisted 
the Nazis and their allies in the persecution of civilians” and who had since immigrated to the 
United States.1  That congressional pressure, applied largely by Representatives Elizabeth 
Holtzman (D-NY) and Joshua Eilberg (D-PA) in their positions on the House Subcommittee for 
Immigration and the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International 
Law, respectively, was the result of a widely perceived failure on the part of the INS to 
adequately investigate and prosecute Nazis and their allies in the United States.  Those 
investigations and prosecutions would now reside under one roof in the Robert F. Kennedy 
building in downtown Washington, D.C.—rather than multiple INS offices throughout the 
country—with a centralized staff to oversee them. 
The INS had been responsible for investigating allegations of immigration fraud relating to 
criminal activity during the Second World War since well before the war’s end. Why had the 
INS failed to investigate these cases during the time in which it was responsible for them?  Why 
were so many people potentially guilty of war crimes able to live quiet, unassuming lives in the 
United States until (and in many cases, even after) the founding of the OSI?  One principal 
reason for these failures is that, especially in the period immediately following the war, 
 
1 Judy Feigin, The Office of Special Investigations: Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust, 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Special Investigations, 2006), iv. 
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investigations of potential war crimes faltered for similar reasons that denazification in Germany 
itself was so chaotic.  That is, the continued need for stability and bureaucratic inertia limited the 
actions the INS took.  Morale crises among Service employees also played a part, compounded 
by a lack of resources.  Additionally, sheer numbers made a truly root-and-branch policy 
impossible; more than 500,000 Europeans immigrated to the United States under the Displaced 
Persons Act and other refugee relief mechanisms, in addition to general immigration from 
countries allied with or occupied by the Nazis.  Director of the OSI Allan A. Ryan, Jr. estimated 
that 2.5 percent of these immigrants been responsible for war crimes during World War II; at 
such a scale, substantively investigating them all would have been impossible.  In this regard, 
investigation of alleged Nazis in the United States closely mirrored denazification in Germany.2  
But perhaps the most important reason was that the INS was more focused on regulating, 
policing, and deporting undocumented Mexican and Latin American migrants than they were on 
prosecuting genocidaires.  In this regard, the institutional history of the INS and the Border 
Patrol combined with the racist undercurrent of American immigration policy to allow potential 
war criminals to escape prosecution and punishment. 
Existing historiography on Nazi war criminals in the United States has thus far neglected 
these explanations for the INS’s failures.  Instead, historians working on this topic have 
highlighted the onset of the Cold War and the rise of the national security state as the prime 
reasons for the INS’s laxity.  Historians of these investigations have uncritically accepted 
frameworks emanating from histories of Operation Paperclip, which focus on a small number of 
high-level individuals guilty of or implicated in war crimes. Additionally, these historians have 
 
2 Feigin, Office of Special Investigations, ix.  For denazification in Germany, which will be discussed below, see 
Perry Biddiscombe, The Denazification of Germany: A History 1945-1950, (Stroud: Tempus, 2007). 
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overwhelmingly pointed to the Cold War and anticommunism as the main reasons for the 
impunity with which war criminals went about their lives in the United States.  A better approach 
to adopt would be that of recent histories on denazification, many of which argue that the Cold 
War, though a factor in the failure of denazification policies, took a backseat to more mundane 
desires and fatigues among both occupied Germans and their American, French, British, and 
Soviet occupiers.  These histories provide instructive models for scholars of Nazi war criminals 






A. The Paperclip Approach 
 Historians of Nazi war criminals in the United States have generally advanced a simple, 
monocausal explanation for the government’s laxity: the Cold War and the attendant needs of the 
new national security state for staunch anti-Communist allies and immigrants.3 This approach is 
counterproductive in providing an accurate narrative of the time period.  To provide a fuller 
accounting of the failures of the United States government to prosecute these alleged criminals, 
historians working on this question would do well to borrow from recent histories on the parallel 
phenomenon of denazification in Germany. These have productively moved away from the 
contention that the Cold War and German rearmament were the sole motivating factors for 
leniency and have instead engaged in a much more “in the weeds” investigation of political and 
popular backlash to the programs in various occupation zones. 
Many historical works on the issue of Nazi war criminals in the United States argue that 
these individuals were not investigated or received lenient treatment because of the United 
States’ anti-Communist priorities during the Cold War. This, however, is only part of the story, 
and other issues took just as much focus away from the problem as did fighting the “Red 
Menace.” Why is it, then, that historians have continually chosen to portray Cold War 
 
3 Reflecting both the secondary literature on this topic and the historical use of the term, I use the term “Nazi war 
criminals” broadly, to include Germans who perpetrated war crimes as members of the Wehrmacht or other German 
armed forces and paramilitaries (e.g. the Schutzstaffel), ethnic Germans in countries invaded by Nazi Germany, 
members of the Nazi Party in decision-making or executive capacities, members of non-German fascist parties from 
unoccupied countries aligned with the Axis powers, and indigenous collaborators (e.g. Ukrainians, citizens of Baltic 
countries) who worked alongside the Nazis to persecute minorities in their own countries. Where necessary I will 
distinguish between these groups. 
 5 
 
considerations as paramount in the story of Nazi war criminals escaping scot-free?  This 
emphasis results from the outsized place that Operation Paperclip occupies in the historiography 
of the immediate postwar period.  
Operation Paperclip was the name of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s program to bring highly 
skilled Germans from the American, British, and French zones of occupation to the United 
States.  By far the most famous category of dubiously moral German immigrants, the 
beneficiaries of Operation Paperclip were high-level scientists working on advanced weapons 
research, especially rocketry.  Perhaps the paradigmatic example is Werner von Braun, don of 
Nazi rocketry science who became integral to the American space program and was never 
punished for the use of slave labor in the rocket construction facilities of the Mittlebau-Dora 
concentration camp, of which he was directly aware.5  Another example is Hubertus Strughold, 
the “Father of Space Medicine,” whose groundbreaking research for NASA was built upon the 
experiments he conducted on concentration camp prisoners.  Both men were directly recruited by 
the national security state and used in the Cold War to compete with the Soviet Union in the 
fields of rocketry and space exploration.  These two men and their compatriots were an 
extremely small portion of the overall flow of immigrants and refugees from postwar Europe to 
the United States and occupied an extremely privileged position vis-à-vis the emerging national 
security state.  Because the vast majority of German and Eastern European immigrants guilty of 
war crimes were so dissimilar from Paperclip beneficiaries, analyses that explain the 
Paperclippers’ escape from justice cannot be applied to other Nazi war criminals. 
 
5 Annie Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program that Brought Nazi Scientists to America, 
(New York: Back Bay Books, 2014), 31. 
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Nevertheless, Operation Paperclip has left an indelible mark on the historiography of 
German and Eastern European war criminals in the United States and has led scholars to point to 
the Cold War as a nearly monocausal explanation for their warm reception.  The proponents and 
beneficiaries of Operation Paperclip justified the program by referencing the “cascade of crises 
in Europe and Asia” that constituted the Cold War.6  The rapid development of military science 
in the Soviet Union served as “the impetus and the justification for Project Paperclip and its 
successor programs during the Cold War.”7  The integration of German scientists within the 
American national security state, and the major role of national security agencies in recruiting 
and relocating these scientists, prevented thorough investigations of their pasts in Germany.  
Indeed, these agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, often directly covered up the scientists’ wartime records.8   
Historians, then, have correctly given the Cold War primacy of place in explaining how 
the beneficiaries of Operation Paperclip avoided investigation and prosecution for war crimes. 
Despite significant differences between the Paperclippers and lower-level Nazi war criminals, 
however, historians have also extended this explanation to the latter group. Historian Christoph 
Schlissel, for instance, argued that “Cold War discourse clearly had shifted attention away from 
Nazi to communist totalitarianism,” and that Nazi war criminals were able to enter the United 
States and avoid investigation and deportation solely because “Nazi Germany had disappeared as 
a threat and…[Germany] was needed as an ally against Stalin’s Soviet Union.”9 In this view, 
 
6 Brian E. Crim, Our Germans: Project Paperclip and the National Security State, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2018), 182-183. 
7 Crim, Our Germans, 119. 
8 Crim, Our Germans, 120. 
9 Christoph Schiessl, Alleged Nazi Collaborators in the United States after World War II, (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2016), 74. 
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agents responsible for resettling displaced persons in the United States “ignored, purposefully or 
not, an applicant’s questionable past” because being “anti-communist [w]as an asset.”10  What 
this explanation ignores is that, prior to the late 1970s, immigration officials generally did not 
even ask most immigrants questions about their “questionable past.”  Most collaborators 
managed to get into the United States without having to hide their past; as historian Eric 
Lichtblau put it, they “came because no one stopped them.”11 
In some sense, historians can be forgiven for inaccurately applying a Paperclip-style view 
given that it is present in many primary source materials, including relevant congressional 
hearings and public statements of immigration officials.  In hearings on the failure to prosecute 
low-level Nazi war criminals, Representative Joshua Eilberg pointedly asked Victor Lowe, 
Director of the General Government Division of the U.S. General Accounting Office, whether 
the INS and other agencies had failed to follow up on leads because “the United States had 
defeated the Nazis and therefore efforts were chiefly directed against Communists.”  Further, 
Representative Eilberg outright stated that he believed “Nazi war criminals were permitted to 
enter the United States [because] the [INS]…was completely preoccupied with Communism.”12  
The GAO also believed that investigations may have been set aside because of the “cold war 
[sic] situation including whether (1) the allegation [of wartime collaboration] may have been 
Communist propaganda and (2) potential information and witnesses were needed from countries 
 
10 Schiessl, Alleged Nazi Collaborators, 80. 
11 Eric Lichtblau, The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler’s Men, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 11. 
12 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, First Session on Alleged Nazi War 
Criminals: Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Immigration, Citizenship, And International Law, 95th Cong. 1st 
sess., 1977, 11-12. 
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under Soviet jurisdiction,” of course also implying that witnesses had been coached by 
Communists insistent on casting the U.S. as the country of safe haven for collaborators.13   
Contemporary journalists reporting on the issue of Nazi war criminals also pointed to the 
Cold War as the reason for the genocidaires’ escape from justice.  Numerous newspapers articles 
are available in which journalists confidently state that “[i]t is known that a number of alleged 
Nazis found work as consultants for the CIA and the State Department, and there has been 
speculation that the INS was specifically asked to protect these men.”  In many, the authors 
included assertions along the lines of the idea that “raging anti-Communism” of the postwar 
United States “quickly rendered the Third Reich insignificant to U.S. policymakers.”14  When 
charges did come to light, some articles claimed that these were “Communist inspired.”15  While 
historians have been quick to replicate these statements in their scholarly works, the GAO, and 
ultimately Congress, came to different conclusions regarding the INS’s immense failures. 
 Beyond adopting the analyses, arguments, and biases present in primary sources, 
historians have reproduced the “Paperclip approach” in their work on lower-level Nazi war 
criminals in part because it offers a seductively simple story. In this account, the FBI, J. Edgar 
Hoover personally, and intelligence agencies like the newborn CIA, assume their familiar 
positions as the villains of postwar domestic politics. Again, this conspiratorial thinking appears 
in the primary source record; Representative Eilberg, for instance, was unsatisfied with an 
 
13 U.S. General Accounting Office, Widespread Conspiracy to Obstruct Probes of Alleged Nazi War Criminals Not 
Supported by Available Evidence—Controversy May Continue, GGD-78-73, Washington, D.C., GAO, 1978, 15. 
14 Matthew Rinaldi, “Guilty but Free,” The Jerusalem Post, April 6, 1979.   
http://silk.library.umass.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/921860439?accountid=14572 (accessed 
February 24, 2020). 
15 Stephen Klaidman, “Haunted by the Past: Latvian Accused of War Crimes,” The Washington Post, October 16, 
1976. http://silk.library.umass.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/146506895?accountid=14572 
(accessed February 25, 2020). 
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investigation of the INS because it failed to “give us answers…it doesn’t name names. It just 
raises more questions.”16  But this type of narrative seeking was not limited to the historical 
actors themselves.  Charles R. Allen, Jr.’s breathless Nazi War Criminals in America: 
Facts…Action; The Basic Handbook, published in book form in 1985, was the prototypical 
example of this bias in the secondary literature (though Allen was a journalist, not a historian). 
Allen trumpets the fact that the United States government knew about Nazi war criminals’ pasts 
“from the beginning,” pointing directly to “the State Department, the intelligence branches of the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the CIA, FBI, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and 
others.”17 Allen’s list of potential Nazi war criminals undergoing court procedures or 
investigations (admittedly an example of excellent reporting, collation, and analysis) was replete 
with notations that this or that Ukrainian or Estonian was “CIA agent since before 1950s” or had 
been “a double-agent for OSS” while part of the Schutzstaffel, the German police organization 
responsible for administering the Holocaust.18  
In other, more professional histories, a similar focus is present.  Christoph Schliessl, for 
instance, discussed how in many cases the “FBI either dismissed accusation of involvement in 
war crimes as communist propaganda or willfully ignored the suspects’ Nazi past.”19 The 
military is also the frequent target of excoriation.   Brian Crim focused on this issue, arguing that 
the interbranch Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, responsible for Operation Paperclip, 
“arranged for expedited investigations that either ignored derogatory data or included amended 
 
16 Howard Blum, “New Actions on Alleged Nazi War Criminals Expected,” The New York Times, June 17, 1978.  
http://silk.library.umass.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/123665778?accountid=14572 (accessed 
February 25, 2020). 
17 Charles R. Allen, Jr., Nazi War Criminals in America: Facts…Action; The Basic Handbook, (Highgate House: 
New York City, 1985), 3. 
18 Allen, Nazi War Criminals, 14; 19. 
19 Schiessl, Alleged Nazi Collaborators, 933. 
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security dossiers.”20 To be sure, the FBI, the military, and the various Cold War “alphabet soup” 
agencies were responsible for more than their fair share of obfuscation; neither Allen nor 
professional historians fabricated stories. The obstructionism of these federal government bodies, 
however, was never the sole reason these Nazi war criminals went uninvestigated and 
unpunished.  Indeed, federal agencies were involved in only a limited number of these cases, and 
the INS itself played only a minor role in the granting of visas to these individuals. 
 This kind of historiographical approach is only feasible because most historians have 
focused either on the major figures of Operation Paperclip or the exceedingly small number of 
cases actually investigated by the U.S. government. In one instructive example of this “Paperclip 
history” style, Richard Breitman and Norman Goda in their Hitler’s Shadow: Nazi War 
Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War devoted an entire chapter to the Nazi bosses 
present at Hitler’s underground bunker in Berlin at the end of the war in Europe.21  Later 
chapters focused specifically on SS generals and Reichssicherheithauptamt (Reich Security Main 
Office; the governmental department responsible for political surveillance) functionaries.  
Breitman and Goda related the stories of Gestapo chiefs, “officers from the army’s elite 
Grossdeutschland Division…and senior Nazi party members.”22  Allen A. Ryan, Jr., head of the 
Office of Special Investigations from 1980 to 1983, wrote Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi 
War Criminals in America in 1984.  Even he, with years of experience investigating Nazi war 
criminals and his famous estimate that 10,000 or more were probably present in the United 
 
20 Crim, Our Germans, 67. 
21 Richard Breitman and Norman J. W. Goda, Hitler’s Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold 
War, (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 2010), 
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat06087a&AN=umass.01124 1287&site=eds-
live&scope=site, 5-15. 
22 Breitman and Goda, Hitler’s Shadow, 53. 
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States, filled Quiet Neighbors with chapter titles like “John Demjanjuk: Ivan the Terrible;” 
“Andrija Arutkovic: The Dean of America’s Nazis;” and “Viorel Trifa and Otto von Bolschwing: 
Pursuing the Guilty.”  While helpfully moving away from only the landmark cases which had 
been prosecuted, Breitman, Goda, et al.’s 2005 U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis nonetheless 
covered only the cases of major figures in either German or Eastern European fascist 
movements.  It is in these cases, those of the bigwigs, scientists, intelligence operatives, and 
other major figures, that the Cold War narrative is most compelling (and most accurate).  When, 
however, historians have broadened the subject matter of their investigations but applied the 
same reasoning, they produced less compelling works. 
 One work that bucks this trend is Russ Bellant’s Old Nazis, the New Right, and the 
Republican Party (1991).  Old Nazis provided a compelling example for historians of this period 
in its detailed investigation of the political paths of collaborators upon arrival in the United 
States.  While Bellant did hew to the traditional Cold War analysis to some extent (e.g. 
highlighting how some collaborators had long and productive careers with Radio Free Europe), 
his account overall departed from this perspective.23  Bellant concluded that “Americans are, in 
general, not aware of the…importance of the Eastern Front in the history of World War II,” and 
that the “resulting ignorance allows us to tolerate an extensive network of [Nazi] 
collaborators…[in] the United States.”24  Not only was this more prosaic, less dramatic 
conclusion admirable, but the scope of his investigation itself was worth replicating.  Bellant 
distinguished himself from other historians working on this topic by not solely investigating 
cases which drew attention from the INS or other federal agencies.  Old Nazis instead included 
 
23 Russ Bellant, Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party: Domestic fascist networks and their effect on 
U.S. cold war [sic] politics, (Boston: South End Press, 1991), 25. 
24 Bellant, Old Nazis, 89. 
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discussions of leaders of small-scale ethnic organizations, like the Slovak-American Republican 
Federation, whose leader Method Balco “still organize[d] in New York City an annual 
commemoration of the Tiso [fascist collaboration government under Nazi] rule.”25   
In uncovering these low-level collaborators whose actions had generally not yet come to 
light, Bellant’s work came closer to the truth in representing the full scale of collaborationist 
presence in the postwar United States.  Further, his work represented an inversion of the normal 
Cold War script; instead of focusing on the Cold War’s effects on the importation of 
collaborators and the government turning a blind eye to them, Bellant documented how these 
under-the-radar collaborators affected the prosecution of the Cold War.  For instance, in his 
section on the American Security Council, he noted how “Hitler collaborators…and anti-Semitic 
activists” formed key nodes in the network linking the United States government to the World 
Anti-Communist League, and in the following pages demonstrated how Eastern European 
nationalists of varying stripes exerted influence on anti-Soviet politics in the 1970s as 80s.26  
Other scholars working on the collaborationist presence in the United States would do well to 
adopt Bellant’s methodological approach. 
 To conclude briefly, the framings under which historians have presented the issue of Nazi 
war criminals in the United States have largely been unproductive.  Not only journalists and 
citizen scholars but professional historians, too, have adopted the rhetoric of the Cold War in 
explaining the presence of Nazi criminals and Eastern European collaborators.  They have relied 
for inspiration on histories of Operation Paperclip and an attendant focus on small numbers of 
criminals compared to the massive inflow of German and Eastern European refugees in the post-
 
25 Bellant, Old Nazis, 15. 
26 Bellant, Old Nazis, 65-77. 
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war period.  Because of this focus, they have produced accounts which, however well-sourced, 
reach conclusions only applicable to this small number of selected cases.  Historical works on 
denazification in Germany provide a more compelling example for historians of Nazi war 
criminals in the United States.  
B. Denazification Historiography 
 Instead of adopting the approaches common in historical works specifically on Nazi war 
criminals in the United States, these (and future) historians should look to recent works on 
denazification in situ.  The key feature of many of these works, despite differing conclusions and 
ideological convictions of the authors, is that they all have included in-depth discussions of the 
politics of the implementation of denazification on the local and national level in Germany.  
Recent works have helpfully departed from the idea that and America’s desire to rearm West 
Germany and transform it into a Cold War ally played the most important role in the failure of 
denazification.  Instead, they have documented how a general spirit of popular resistance to these 
initiatives hamstrung American, British, and French, as well as German, executors of 
denazification policies and programs.27  Additionally, many of these works point out that 
incompetence and laziness, rather than malice and conspiracy, represented larger barriers to 
effective denazification.  Bureaucratic roadblocks and floods of paperwork determined outcomes 
more directly than did malicious national security operatives.  Denazification histories 
demonstrated that even high priority programs were hampered by shoddy implementation and 
 
27 I note here that each zone of occupation (British, American, French, and Soviet) had (in some cases wildly) 
different policies and plans for implementing denazification.  In this paper I will focus primarily on historical works 
discussing the American zone, with some analysis of works on the British zone as well.  Works on denazification in 
the Federal Republic of Germany (also known as West Germany), created out of the three non-Soviet zones, will 
also be a subject of analysis in this paper. 
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the volume of work to be completed.  Additionally, these works have focused on low-level 
perpetrators, which dramatically altered the narrative and provided a more expansive account 
than did works which looked only at the defendants of the Nuremberg trials.  Finally, influential 
works on denazification have shown how the program’s failure was tied more to a simple desire 
to move on, away from the past, than to any national security concerns.  These and other 
characteristics of histories on denazification are useful signposts for historians working on the 
issue of Nazi war criminals in the United States. 
 The first defining feature of denazification historiography, and most instructive for 
scholars investigating Nazi war criminals in the United States, is an in-depth look at the politics 
of specific efforts to root out Nazis from German society.  These extended from denazification 
policies in the earliest phases of the occupation to the final winding down of the programs in 
Konrad Adenauer’s Federal Republic of Germany.28  For instance, Perry Biddiscombe’s The 
Denazification of Germany (2007), which provided an in-depth survey of denazification in the 
various zones of occupation, examined how the philosophical underpinnings of the policies in 
each zone—American idealism, British pragmatism, Soviet dialectical materialism—determined 
the outlines of different denazification plans.  Biddiscombe then documented how conditions on 
the ground and the political struggles of implementation led to the abandonment of these ideals 
and outlines, culminating in “muddled and self-contradictory” implementation from the Saarland 
to Stettin.29  Norbert Frei’s definitional Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past (2002) 
investigated of the politics of denazification after the founding of the Federal Republic, including 
 
28 Konrad Adenauer was the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which capacity he served from 
1949 to 1963. 
29 Biddiscombe, Denazification, 119. 
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an “past-political” projects in West Germany and the “process of past-political border 
demarcation and the establishment of corresponding legal norms.”30   
Where “Paperclip histories” viewed the politics of the Operation narrowly, i.e. as fights 
largely between unelected bureaucrats in the constellation of national security agencies, 
Biddiscombe, Frei, and others working on denazification in Germany included extensive analysis 
of the roles played by individual parliamentarians and whole political parties, as well as the 
connections between these groups with public interest lobbies and key nodes of the bureaucracy.  
Frei’s work also included discussions of the ways in which German culture and political 
structures writ large impacted the denazification process.  For instance, Frei and others 
investigated how political actors used the deepening Cold War to achieve their political goals, 
playing American desires for a contribution to NATO defenses against a popular desire for 
amnesty, especially on the part of massively influential soldiers’ organizations like the League of 
German Soldiers.31  This stands in contrast to Paperclip histories, where the “Cold War” is 
frequently presented as a historical actor in its own right rather than a phenomenon which 
historical actors used to achieve their own political goals.  Scholars of Nazi war criminals in the 
United States would do well to learn from these examples, particularly of the connections 
between policymakers and the bureaucracy, which had a demonstrable effect on prosecution in 
America. 
 Denazification historiography has also helpfully documented the ways that apathy, 
resentment, and incompetence, more than obstruction through skullduggery, harmed 
 
30 Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration, translated by Joel 
Golb, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), xv. 
31 Frei, Adenauer’s Germany, 203ff. 
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denazification programs in the western zones of occupation and later in West Germany.  The 
scale of the problem in Germany, with millions of Party members, demobilized soldiers, and 
collaborators of various stripes (discussed below), led many Germans to the conclusion that a 
witch hunt was taking place; as a result, many lied about their Nazi affiliations to avoid what 
they saw as deeply unfair punishment for normal wartime or political behavior.32  Rather than 
forcing through a thoroughgoing investigation of uncooperative subjects, German authorities 
largely abandoned the project.  Despite an “appetite” for “anti-Nazi purges,” Germans evinced 
“little popular acceptance of ‘collective guilt,’” which led to non-cooperation and foot-dragging 
on the part of German authorities and civilians.33  Universities, thoroughly penetrated by both 
Nazi party members and the ideas from which the party drew, presented a particular nightmare 
for occupation authorities, as university administrators to whom denazification had been 
devolved were reluctant to dismiss their colleagues, comrades, and friends.34  
Many denazification councils were locally oriented, which further complicated the 
process.  While states and major cities had their own denazification chambers, smaller, regional 
political units in Germany had their own as well.  At this level as well the occupation authorities 
faced similar challenges, with the members of small rural communities often reluctant to pass 
(deservedly harsh) judgment on their neighbors for activities which the denazification judges 
themselves may have supported during the war.35  Firms and businesses were required to self-
police and report members of the Nazi party working at all positions higher than manual labor; it 
is not hard to see why this was unpopular, especially among the business owners who made up a 
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significant base of support for the Nazi party.  Incompetence also hampered the various 
denazification programs—the American military government repeatedly handed down “hastily 
conceived and badly drawn” dispatches and policies, which often contradicted previous 
policies.36  Wildly shifting policy and enforcement priorities took precedence over moral 
justice—a fact which we will see repeated in American investigations of collaborators.  
Incompetence played a much more significant role in investigatory failures than did any kind of 
conspiracy, and historians of denazification have accordingly paid more attention to this factor 
than have their American counterparts. 
 In a similar vein, works on denazification in Germany have documented how the sheer 
volume of work to be completed, with tens of millions of members of the Nazi Party and fellow 
travelers to be judged and millions of Fragebogen37 to be analyzed, militated against a 
successful denazification program.  American occupation authorities, for instance, processed 
some 1,600,000 of these denazification surveys and removed nearly 374,000 Germans from 
positions in civil service, education, and other areas (many were later reinstated, either by the 
occupying powers or by indigenous authorities).38  These numbers alone posed a massive 
problem to the U.S. military; “popular pressures to demobilize” only compounded matters.39  
Rather than a shadowy Cold War conspiracy, recent works have pointed to the “lack of adequate 
[American military] manpower” to adjudicate this massive paperwork load as one of the major 
reasons for the failure of the early denazification programs.40  As mentioned above, the military 
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government performed review of all business’ self-reporting, which represented a “mammoth 
and quite impossible task” from sheer volume of documents.41  This mirrored the narrative of 
investigations in the United States when the number of collaborators who may have been present 
in the United States is taken into account; a workload of this size militated against a true 
reckoning with the problem.42   
istorianshere t hese histories have focused on the question of low-leve l pe rpet rators, rathe r tha n larger-tha n-li fe figures l ike e rmann öring a nd lbert peer, they a re both more effective and prov ide better examples for historia ns of azi wa r criminals in t he nited tates. he oc cupying powers (and later, e rma n de nazification councils and commissions) were confronted with the nearly insurm ountable task of inve stigating mil lions of people a nd ma ssively reorganizing erma n society, from civil serv ice to private busine ss. ome historians of denazification have e ndeavored t o show t hat these policie s could ne ver have worke d given the numbe rs with whic h they we re confronted; “the la w was not seriously crippl ing only because it wa s not seriously im pleme nted.” ha ve shown that the llie s recog nized this occasionally ; pla ns “for the summary execution” a nd “mass shooting s of erma n officers” were a bandone d, for while t hey mayhave bee n just punishme nts for those eng aged in a crim inal conspiracy, such a mass exercise of victor’ s justice wa s bot h logist ically im possible and like ly to arouse viole nt resista nce.
Narratives that would be possible to reasonably present if historians focused only on the 
leaders like Reinhard Gehlen or Kurt Waldheim who escaped punishment lose coherence when 
applied to these millions of fellow travelers and Wehrmacht draftees.  While in the case of 
Waldheim or generals of the rearmed West Germany, for instance, it is reasonable to assert that 
the successful prosecution of the Cold War prevented NATO powers from punishing wartime 
military leaders, this clearly cannot be the case for millions of less famous Germans.  Historians 
working on the subject of Nazi war criminals in the United States should adopt similar 
approaches, understanding that Cold War myopia is unlikely to have been the sole reason that the 
INS failed to investigate the presence of possibly thousands of unpunished war criminals in the 
United States. 
 Denazification histories have shown that the failure to prosecute Nazi war criminals in 
situ was at least in part a result of a desire to get on with daily life and to protect critical services.  
This is not to say that these histories argue denazification failed because Germans were saddling 
up to the challenge of being a Cold War partner, but rather that day-to-day concerns regarding 
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administration, logistics, and other more prosaic matters took precedence over what many in 
Germany saw as “grotesque” witch hunts.46  For instance, scholars like Perry Biddiscombe have 
investigated how the indispensable services of the Reichsbahn, the German railways, were 
protected from denazification by U.S. occupation authorities, who “exempted all but the most 
senior” National Socialists from expulsion because of the need for continued logistical 
capacity.47  It was the question of “finding adequate replacements for dismissed Nazis” that 
loomed larger in the minds of military planners than questions of either military necessity or 
justice—or, for that matter, retribution.48  German executors of denazification policy also 
worried about “wholesale collapse of the administrative structure.”49  This overriding need for 
postwar stability was reflected in the INS as well; director of the OSI Allen A. Ryan, Jr., 
identified that investigators were “veterans of the war…and after the war they raised families and 
worked forty hours a weeks in a secure job,” more focused on bringing “home a paycheck” than 
making “Nazis a high priority.”50 
Philosophical questions also plagued investigators; not necessarily everyone who was a 
member of the Party had directly been involved in the commission of a crime, while many who 
were not members of the Party at all were deeply implicated in the worst excesses of the Nazi 
period.51  Both of these issues would later confront investigators of Nazi war criminals in the 
United States.  As with denazification in Germany, American investigators had to rely on records 
scattered all over Germany in various archives belonging to either indigenous or occupation 
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authorities, and which were not centralized until the establishment of the Berlin Document 
Center.  For their own part, the INS had similar organizational deficiencies, and its files 
remained scattered among local offices until the late 1970s.  Thorny philosophical and normative 
questions would also confront American investigators; what constituted persecution?  How did 
concepts like due process and the imposition of ex post facto law affect the hunt for and 
punishment of Nazi war criminals in the United States?  Scholars would do well to acknowledge 
the work that denazification historians have done on these topics and integrate their approaches 
into works on the American side of the story. 
 To conclude this historiographical review, scholars working on the issue of Nazi war 
criminals in America would do well to adopt the approaches of historians of denazification.  The 
former group has generally evinced conspiratorial understandings of the collaborator presence in 
the United States, which they can only do by focusing on the small number of cases where this 
actually matches the evidence and ignoring the numbers of potential Nazi war criminals residing 
in America.  Denazification historians have provided useful examples of improved approaches, 
including the highlighting of more prosaic reasons why denazification failed.  These included 
logistical and administrative crises among denazification authorities, a general concern for 
societal stability, and the problem of investigating and prosecuting potentially millions of 
German nationals.  As we will see in the investigation below, these facts are also present in the 






The identification, investigation, and prosecution of Nazi war criminals living in the United 
States was a massive administrative and moral failure of the United States government.  Contrary 
to the reasons that apply to the case of the Paperclip scientists, this failure was the result of two 
major factors: the sheer bureaucratic morass of an immigration apparatus that expanded 
massively during and immediately after the Second World War; and a racist focus on regulating 
the arrival, labor, and departure of Mexican migrants, which came to dominate the minds of key 
figures in the immigration bureaucracy and its legislative allies.  Other factors also contributed to 
the INS’s failure, including a lack of resources and a deeply unmotivated workforce.  Even the 
few cases which the United States government actually investigated contributed to fatigue among 
investigators, who experienced massive burnout as they worked to meet the high legal bars to 
denaturalization and deportation of war criminals. 
A. Who were they and how did they get here? 
 The Second World War rendered much of Europe a wasteland and many millions of its 
inhabitants homeless, out of work, and lacking reliable access to food, medicine, and basic 
shelter.  The final months of the war, in which German air defenses had been comprehensively 
smashed by Allied air power, were particularly devastating to Germany.  While the bombing 
campaign may have had little effect on collective morale or industrial production, it killed large 
numbers of German civilians and destroyed huge portions of the housing stock in locations as 
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varied as the world-renowned city of Hamburg and the tiny Dollbergen, population 1,400.52  
German civilians, of course, were not the only people to be displaced: during the war Germany 
had forcibly relocated millions of mostly Slavic workers within its borders to serve as slave 
labor.  At its height in the summer of 1944, this program resulted in the presence of six million 
noncombatants forced to labor on behalf of the Führer’s government.53  These forced laborers 
were joined by others, including Soviet citizens who fled before the advance of the resurgent Red 
Army for fears, real or imagined, of retribution by Soviet authorities. While some of those 
fleeing westward away from the Soviets were innocent of any wrongdoing, a portion of them had 
in fact collaborated with the Germans in the territories that came under the control of that 
country following 1939.54   
This collaboration ranged from the relatively benign (e.g. ensuring the continued function 
of urban sanitation facilities) to the murderous, including participation in the horrific massacres 
of Jews organized by the SS and often carried out with the assistance of German police and local 
auxiliaries.  Many of the members of this latter category were involved in local nationalist 
movements in the interwar period.  As the German tanks and horse-drawn carts rolled in, some 
welcomed them as liberators, especially in places like Ukraine and the Baltic countries, for 
reasons as varied as memories of persecution by the Soviets or rabid anti-Semitism, which 
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frequently was entangled with anti-communism in Eastern Europe.55  Members of the indigenous 
fascist movements in countries like Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the now-former Yugoslav 
republics were also among those left in Germany at war’s end.  These Eastern European fascists 
had, whether independently or under German tutelage, also participated in massacres of Jews, 
Communists, Social Democrats, national minorities, and other groups.   
Of course, in a Europe devastated by a war the Germans launched, it was not only 
Eastern European fascists who were to be found in Germany.  Some 18,000,000 Germans had 
served in the country’s armed forces, and despite extremely heavy casualties, millions of these 
soldiers remained alive.  It is important to note that, contrary to beliefs that were commonplace 
in the immediate postwar period (and stretching into the 1990s and 2000s), the traditional armed 
forces of Germany were deeply implicated in the worst crimes of the war.  Army leadership, of 
course, was mainly responsible for the more grotesque and horrific war crimes including the 
starvation of millions of Soviet prisoners of war, but German soldiers in the field were also 
frequently guilty of more “quotidian” war crimes, including theft, rape, assault, and murder of 
the civilian population of the Soviet Union.56  As the Germans stretched their empire ever 
eastward, the Wehrmacht was a willing and eager participant in these crimes, particularly as the 
“partisan wars” heated up to the rear of the front.57   
Smaller, but more sensational in their violence were the Einsatzgruppen, and later the 
Waffen SS, Himmler’s legions of “political soldiers.”  The Einsatzgruppen were responsible for 
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the mass murders of Jews and other minorities in places like Babi Yar, often augmented by 
regular army units or military police.  The Waffen SS was initially comprised of legions made up 
of German volunteers, but during the course of the war expanded to include volunteer legions 
from many German-occupied countries.  The Waffen SS was regarded by the Wehrmacht with 
“not unfounded distrust” based both on its usurpation of the army’s traditional patrimony but 
also its “numerous incidents of brutality and massacres” stretching from Poland to the Don 
River.58  Eventually, the Soviet Union pushed the forces of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen SS, and 
their collaborators back into Nazi Germany, where most found themselves on May 8, 1945, the 
formal end of hostilities in Europe.  This meant that, on V-E Day, millions of demobilized 
potential war criminals shuffled through the destroyed towns, villages, and cities of Germany. 
As the war ground to its bloody end, many of these displaced persons found themselves 
under the authority of the Allied militaries.  These millions of displaced persons, “DPs” in the 
administrative parlance of the time that has since become common, represented a serious 
problem for Allied authorities.  A number of them could be repatriated to their countries of 
origin, sometimes happily—as for many French or Scandinavian DPs—and sometimes over 
strenuous protests—as for many Poles, Ukrainians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and other constituent 
Soviet nationalities.59  The continued protests and independent cultural life of this latter group 
was a thorny problem for the Allies; for instance, Polish songs which referenced Soviet 
oppression frequently offended Soviet officials even in Western-run camps.60  In another 
example, Croatian collaborators in displaced persons camps continued to loudly and defiantly 
celebrate the German- and Italian-sponsored establishment of the fascist Independent State of 
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Croatia.61 Some, especially former Soviet citizens, remained in the camps for years.  In response, 
many American relief organizations lobbied Congress to grant special exemptions from the 
country’s racist and restrictive immigration laws and allow these refugees to resettle in the 
United States.  In a cruelly ironic twist, these humanitarian exemptions, combined with 
resettlement officers in Europe’s generous interpretations of what constituted aid to an enemy 
belligerent, ended up allowing numerous Nazi collaborators into the United States.62 
The mechanism by which a number of these DPs and other Europeans, whether guilty of 
war crimes or not, relocated to the United States was the Displaced Persons Act of 1948.  The 
passage of this act was the result of sustained lobbying campaigns by humanitarian 
organizations, but even it had substantial shortcomings compared to their desiderata.  In 
particular, it mortgaged the number of DP arrivals from each country against that country’s quota 
for future years, borrowing from the future to pay for the present.  Despite these limitations, the 
Act nonetheless paved the way for the arrival of nearly 400,000 DPs.63  Later amendments to the 
Act, which liberalized the procedures for allowing Jewish DPs into the United States, also 
unintentionally opened the gates to members of both the non-military and armed wings of the 
SS.64   
Following close on the heels of the Displaced Persons Act, in 1953 the Eisenhower 
administration spearheaded the passage of the Refugee Relief Act.  This act enabled the 
resettlement of another 185,000 or more DPs in the United States, along with additional 
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immigrants from Soviet-controlled countries in the Eastern bloc.65  Among many perfectly 
innocent and needy DPs, war criminals and collaborators used the legal channels of the 
Displaced Persons and Refugee Relief Acts to resettle in the United States.  The criminal acts of 
the guilty among this group took many forms; some had worked as camp guards, other in 
indigenous fascist organizations or governments, and some volunteered for or were conscripted 
into the foreign legions of the Waffen SS.  And of course, as discussed above in the 
historiographical review, a number of German scientists working in key defense industries would 
be spirited into the United States, or have their applications sped along, by the military and 
intelligence agencies.  Their stories, however, have been told in detail; it is to the efforts to locate 
the lesser-known Nazis collaborators that we will now turn. 
B. Early efforts at location 
Advocates of the Displaced Persons and Refugee Relief Acts were aware that some Nazi 
war criminals could take advantage of the opportunity to come to the United States by 
downplaying or hiding their wartime activities.  Screening was put in place in the DP camps in 
Europe to ascertain the backgrounds of potential refugees.  Detainees, however, were obviously 
anxious to avoid being classed as collaborators, and came up with numerous strategies to deflect 
the questions asked of them.66  In general, DPs who wanted to do so were able to successfully 
convince camp workers that they were deserving of refugee status and resettlement.  Because of 
the structure of the Displaced Persons Act, which accepted tout court the classifications of the 
aid workers in displaced persons camps in Europe, there was almost no further investigation of a 
DP’s past once the initial determination on refugee status had been made.  Investigators did not 
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proactively attempt to determine whether refugees arriving in the United States had collaborated 
with the German or other Axis governments, and relied mostly on outside tips or intra-camp 
denunciations to determine whether migrants arriving under the provisions of the Displaced 
Persons and Refugee Relief Acts had committed immigration fraud or participated in wartime 
persecutions. 
Once alleged collaborators arrived in the United States, responsibility for investigating 
allegations fell upon the Immigration and Naturalization Service.  This agency had always been 
something of a red-headed stepchild in the United States government.  It had a long, winding 
path from Cabinet department to Cabinet department and a long history of development within 
the federal state, with responsibilities and statutory authorities delegated and taken away with 
little warning or ramp-up time.  The first agency to regulate immigration was the Office of the 
Superintendent of Immigration, founded in 1891 under the Treasury Department.  In 1903, the 
newly renamed Bureau of Immigration was transferred to the Department of Commerce and 
Labor; its duties were augmented in 1906 to include overseeing naturalization processes.  These 
responsibilities were split into two Bureaus in 1914.  Finally, in 1933 Congress merged the 
Bureau of Immigration with the Bureau of Naturalization to form the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, which Franklin Delano Roosevelt moved to the Justice Department in 
1940.  The Immigration and Naturalization Service would remain there until 2003, when it was 
dissolved, and its functions transferred to various successor agencies housed in the Department 
of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice. 
Prosecutions in this period tended to be high-profile, controversial, time-consuming, and 
difficult when they happened at all.  Only five deportation cases were initiated by the INS during 
the entire decade of the 1950s, of which only one resulted in the defendant leaving the United 
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States.67  The Eichmann trial sparked some public interest, and generated some additional 
charges in the 1960s, but still few convictions, and fewer deportations.  These cases were 
separated into two parts: denaturalization and deportation, both of which had enormously high 
evidentiary requirements and standards of proof.  Investigations and trials could take years, 
sometimes decades, only for appeals to render the process worthless because judges so often 
feared repatriating denaturalized criminals to countries like the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, 
where it was likely they would face “conviction and execution” at “the hands of [their] 
enemies.”68  Other options, like sending guilty collaborators to Ireland or Latin American 
countries, were available, but American authorities wanted to avoid accusations that they were 
sending Nazis to cushy retirements and so decided “it was safest not to do anything.”69  Attempts 
by European countries to secure extradition of naturalized war criminals frequently failed as 
well.  Neither the INS nor the State Department were convinced that trials in communist 
countries, which issued the majority of extradition requests, would ensure due process of the 
accused.70  All of these factors contributed to a dismal record of successfully prosecuting Nazi 
war criminals in the United States.   
This record of failure continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s until increased scrutiny 
from Congress forced the INS into action.  Elizabeth Holtzman shockingly defeated 25-term 
immigration policy giant Emanuel Celler in the New York Democratic congressional primary 
and occupied his seat in 1972.  Holtzman, who was herself Jewish and represented a heavily 
Jewish district in Congress, was contacted by an INS official and informed that the government 
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knew of but did nothing about a number of Nazis living in the United States.  Similarly 
concerned about the issue was Representative Joshua Eilberg, who from 1973 to 1978 served as 
the chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration.71  In response to these 
efforts, the INS agreed in 1977 to create a Special Litigation Unit to investigate Nazi war 
criminals.  The SLU, however, failed to produce results.  After a series of confrontational 
hearings, General Accounting Office probes, and congressional investigations, Holtzman (and, to 
a lesser degree, Eilberg) spearheaded the founding of the Office of Special Investigations in 
1979, which removed the responsibility for prosecuting Nazi war criminals from the INS and 
placed it in the Justice Department directly under the Attorney General. 
C. Assessment of INS efforts 
Before assessing the success or failure of the INS’s efforts to locate Nazi war criminals in 
the United States, one important historical question must be answered: just how many of these 
people might there have been?  The historical record seems to support Allen A. Ryan, Jr.’s 
contention that more than 10,000 war criminals could have been hiding in the United States.  
Some 18,000,000 Germans served in the armed forces of Nazi Germany over the course of the 
Second World War.  The German military also augmented this number by drafting locals (e.g. 
Russians, Ukrainians, or Cossacks), who were either absorbed into the traditional armed forces, 
enrolled in the foreign legions of the Waffen SS, or corralled into collaborationist forces like 
Andrei Vlasov’s Russian Liberation Army.72  The vast majority of these served on the Eastern 
Front, where war crimes were extremely common.  The SS, including the Waffen SS, was 
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declared a criminal organization prima facie at the Nuremberg Trials.  Because of this 
determination, anyone who had been a member of either the SS itself or any subsidiary 
organizations could be considered a war criminal.   
The Wehrmacht was also directly responsible for its own share of illegal violence, again 
from the level of the high command down to the individual Soldat carrying out reprisals for 
partisan attacks.  Upon the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht assumed for itself the 
responsibility of “pillag[ing] the country,” treating the “east [as] only a colonial exploitation 
area” where there “was no need to pay the slightest heed to the indigenous population.”73  In the 
German war in the East, the Wehrmacht could not keep its low-level troops from “having to fight 
the war of ideologies;” that is, the war of extermination of civilian populations.74  As Omer 
Bartov succinctly put it, average soldiers “either participated in numerous massacres or 
witnessed them at close quarters, and many…reported such events whether with fascination, 
glee, or horror…the young men who rebuilt both Germanys had…been closely associated with 
genocide during their long years of service in uniform.”75   
The average soldier was thus likely to have been at least a witness to some event which 
could rise to the level of a war crime; “German combat troops…showed little reluctance, indeed 
often demonstrated much enthusiasm, in carrying out the ‘criminal orders’” handed down by 
high command.76  In the final analysis, the “attempt to differentiate between the Wehrmacht and 
the SS…presents a wholly false picture of historical reality.”77  Even general social distinctions 
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like class and upbringing seem to have dissolved in shared loyalty to the regime and willingness 
to commit war crimes.78  Soldiers who never fired at, stole from, or otherwise abused civilians 
may nonetheless have been guilty of war crimes if they participated in the detention, starvation, 
and murder of Soviet prisoners of war.  Indeed, many of the convictions that American courts 
later handed down, including to Hermine Braunsteiner-Ryan and others like her, were for low-
level guards at concentration camps.  An estimate of 10% of demobilized German and 
collaborator soldiers having committed war crimes thus seems reasonable, if not charitable.  That 
would equal some 1,800,000 potential war criminals from the military alone.  These numbers do 
not account for the fact that some 600,000 members of the Nazi party itself were declared by the 
Nuremberg tribunal to have been criminals irrespective of individual actions.80 
The second question is how many of these potential criminals migrated to the United 
States.  These estimations are difficult to make and are in part based more on logic than 
empirical data, which are scarce in the source material.  Scholars and social scientists have been 
reluctant to provide hard numbers in their estimates.  It is, however, possible to conduct some 
back-of-the-envelope math to arrive at a possible figure.  Recognizing that these estimates can be 
criticized, I have purposely opted to use low percentages for the following numbers.  In fiscal 
year 1948, after the quotas had been reopened, 21,365 German citizens immigrated to the United 
States, including DPs with German citizenship; by 1960 there were nearly one million 
immigrants in the United States who had been born in Germany.81  More than half a million DPs 
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entered the United States in the wake of the war; more citizens of Soviet-occupied countries 
would enter the United States as refugees over the course of the Cold War.82  One population 
worthy of note were the Volksdeutsche, ethnic German inhabitants of east European countries 
who benefitted disproportionately from and often heavily collaborated with German occupation 
efforts.  The Volksdeutsche were specifically allotted 50% of the quota visas from Germany and 
Austria in the immediate postwar period.83   
Specific demographic information on these immigrant populations is difficult to find.  Of 
the one million German passport-holding immigrants residing in the United States by 1960, I 
assume at least 10% of them were veterans of the war, some 100,000.  Relying on the above 
estimate that 10% of Wehrmacht soldiers could be found guilty of some type of war crime, 
whether related specifically to the Holocaust or not, this yields 10,000 regular, non-DP German 
immigrants who could be considered war criminals.  Further, it seems reasonable to assume that 
DPs admitted under the Displaced Persons Act and later legislation either committed war crimes 
as part of uniformed military service, collaborated in some capacity with occupation 
governments, or served indigenous fascist movements at a rate of 2.5%.84  It follows, then that 
out of a total population of 500,000, some 12,500 DPs guilty of war crimes may have entered the 
United States.  Even if the above figures represent a drastic overestimate, if only 1% of DPs 
participated in criminal activities during the war, that would represent 5,000 people. Added to 
my estimate of guilty Wehrmacht veterans in the United States, this accounting yields a total 
number of anywhere from 15,000 to 27,500.  What, then, to make of the fact that only some 
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several hundred allegations were investigated by the INS?  What were the reasons for this 
failure? 
As documented above, historians of Nazi war criminals in the United States have seized 
on a handful of cases, which they have instrumentalized to show that Nazi war criminals escaped 
justice largely for reasons relating to the Cold War.  In many of the more high-profile cases that 
have received scholarly and popular attention, this framing has merits: the CIA, the FBI, or the 
military did indeed stymie efforts to investigate the individuals or knew about their pasts at the 
time of admission.  Not every war criminal, however, was Wernher von Braun, and most were 
not even Andrija Artukovic or Bishop Trifa.  Hermine Braunsteiner, the low-level camp guard 
who was eventually denaturalized and deported for physical violence against camp inmates (e.g. 
striking and kicking prisoners), was probably more typical.  Based on the math above, thousands 
more people whose acts were similar to hers and could have been prosecuted, had they been 
discovered, were likely in the United States.  With a truer appreciation for the nature and number 
of the crimes of most people who could have been investigated, the Cold War narrative breaks 
down.  Scholars of Nazi war criminals in the United States need to propose alternate 
explanations for the failure of the American government to impose justice, several of which I 
offer below. 
The first reason for the INS’s failure was organizational and institutional.  The INS in the 
period immediately following the war was “severely disorganized.”  In Congressional hearings, 
investigators discussed how agency failures were at least in part the result of “how the agency 
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[was] organized and did its business in the old days.”85  Applicants to the Service were viewed 
by other public servants as the dregs of the bureaucracy; “agents were often culled from 
applicants who could not qualify for the FBI, [IRS], Treasury, or other prestigious operations.”  
The agency was “ingrown” and horribly organized, a “fleet of lesser ships, each with its own 
captain, loosely subject to the commands of an admiral who was never quite sure where all his 
ships were heading,” in one imaginative and illuminating metaphor.86  Even after the 
organization of the Special Litigation Unit in July 1977, the INS offices responsible for 
investigating Nazi war criminals remained a “nest of inefficiency, incompetence, and absolute 
dead-level inertia.” 87   
Not only did the agency not have a systematized process for investigating allegations of 
war crimes, “nothing was on a computer in that entire agency, nothing.  There was no 
computerization of any data.”88  Again, even as late as the 1970s, the implacable Charles R. 
Allen, Jr. described the inner workings of the INS as follows: 
I went into one room which [INS officials] showed us in order to demonstrate what [they] 
had inherited [from previous officials responsible for investigating Nazi war criminals]. 
The sloth, the mismanagement, in terms of management of—from an efficiency point, 
not a moral point, a total corruption of office management. There were stacks and stacks 
and stacks in this one large room, as large as this room we are in now, stacks and stacks 
and stacks of unopened file cabinets and boxes and cardboard cartons, with visa entry 
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applications falling all over the floor and with other just deplorable conditions…I have 
done stories in the past on the INS and I have never been particularly impressed with that 
agency’s qualitative level of operation or conceptual abilities.89 
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman noted critically that, in many cases, sheer overwork and lack 
of prioritization led to a “[two]-year delay in interviewing all the witnesses in…case[s] where 
proceedings have been instituted.”90  As quoted in The Jerusalem Post, Holtzman claimed that 
the INS was “spinning wheels” and offering “[m]ere talk of ‘continuing investigations.’”91  The 
vast majority of the Congressional committee’s questions to the Commissioner Leonel J. Castillo 
and various other INS officials were answered with some version of “I don’t know” or “I am not 
familiar with that case;” the Commissioner’s own knowledge of these cases was nearly 
nonexistent.  To defend himself and his agency, Commissioner Leonel J. Castillo stated that he 
“[didn’t] know why we didn’t move more vigorously.  I really could not tell based on what I 
know about these cases, why we didn't move more vigorously.”92  The INS’s self-defense in 
these hearings hardly argued against the assertion that it was “one of the most clumsy divisions 
in the U.S. governmental bureaucracy.”93 
The INS’s proposed solution to its organizational problems belies the pitiful state of the 
agency prior to 1977; Commissioner Castillo recommended that “all existing files and material 
connected with the Nazi war criminal program…be transferred from New York and other district 
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offices to the central office here in Washington…the review of these files [should] be 
accomplished by attorneys rather than by investigators.”94  Clearly this meant that investigations 
had been handled unsystematically by individual field offices, supervised largely by investigators 
trained little if at all, and that no unity of purpose animated the search for Nazi war criminals.  
The investigations, and the files needed for these efforts, were “spread throughout the country, 
distributed in such a way that it was very difficult to assess responsibility; very difficult to even 
know where all the files were. And, therefore, it was almost impossible for a concentrated effort 
to develop.”  The state of the organization was so bad that “such things as mundane as the 
numbering of pages, and numbering of documents, [or] making microfilm copies to be saved 
somewhere else” had never been carried out.95  Microfilms, it seemed, would have been 
considered advanced technology at the INS; when Holtzman asked Castillo how the Service 
intended to track immigrants without computers, he “raised a manila folder.  ‘Most of our files 
are maintained in brown folders like these.’”96 In seemingly low-stakes budget hearings, totally 
divorced from the Nazi war criminal question, Castillo and his aides answered routine questions 
“with apparently unsubstantiated approximations, estimates, and frequent referrals to studies or 
matters under study,” a performance which members of the committee described as 
“inexcusable.”97  Service higher-ups were, in the words of one understandably disgruntled 
former employee, not fit to provide “proper and inspired leadership.”98  In an organization with 
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this level of dysfunction, no conspiracy of silence was necessary to silence claims of 
collaboration and obstruction; incompetence and disorganization were enough to confound any 
would-be Nazi hunters.  
The INS’s failure to follow up on FBI tips is also demonstrative of another reason for the 
agency’s failure: the INS investigators were, for the most part, reliant on tips originating outside 
the agency.  There was no office dedicated to proactively investigating immigration fraud (the 
offense with which the agency charged most Nazi war criminals who they did manage to 
identify).99  Prior to 1973 there was not even a “formal system by which these allegations” from 
other agencies (or independent outsiders like Charles R. Allen, Jr.) could be investigated; cases 
were assigned ad hoc to investigators with no central clearinghouse.100  Some of the agency’s 
most high-profile cases, including that of Feodor Fedorenko, were initiated only upon receipt of 
extensive documentation from Simon Wiesenthal or other private Nazi hunters; even then, 
“mounting pressure” from both the public and other governmental bodies was necessary for the 
agency to begin any kind of investigation.101  Even upon receiving tips from the FBI, the INS 
frequently failed to investigate; after the FBI “informed INS [sic] of five persons alleged to be 
Nazi war criminals,” the INS did not review the information and “there was no formal procedure 
for reviewing documents referred by other agencies.”102  During the course of investigations, 
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Service employees would often receive tips from the general public; they were, however, 
“deluged, and…not in a position to organize the material…We didn’t even have enough money 
for our witnesses” in the case at hand.103 
This bureaucratic incompetence, bordering on malpractice, was at least partly the result 
of the massive increase in the size and importance of the INS in the second half of the twentieth 
century without a corresponding increase in manpower.  Initially, this was accompanied by an 
increase in funding for the agency, but this was never enough to meet its (perceived) needs.  In 
its 1954 “Operation Wetback,” the Service responded to criticism of its laxity along the border 
by turning its attention to the supposed flood of undocumented Mexican workers present in 
Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California.  800 Border Patrol agents used a small fleet of 
military surplus vehicles to arrest and deport some 1,000,000 or more Mexican nationals.  Even 
this major undertaking received only a little more than one-hundred million inflation-adjusted 
dollars, which would seem to modern observers to be a shoestring budget.104  In the midst of this 
massive operation, the Service had to rely on “cost-saving strategies” to make up for “the 
shortage of…personnel.”105  Once the Operation concluded, the Service reorganized and initiated 
the use of “seventy-three two-man teams of officers” to surveil the border; compared to previous 
efforts, “the best [these teams] could do was…‘just grab somebody.’”106  Deportations and 
apprehensions declined precipitously.  In testimony that prefigured Commissioner Castillo’s in 
1977, Commissioner Joseph Swing, a retired lieutenant general, defended his record using the 
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weak logic that “[f]ewer apprehensions…were a clear indication that fewer Mexican nationals 
were attempting illicit entry.”107  Even the one aspect of its work that was its priority, deportation 
and policing of the southern border, the Service carried out poorly, and the post-“Wetback” years 
would see the Service and the Patrol largely retreat from strict enforcement. 
 he erv ice’s retreat from agg re ssive enforcement re flected a n ove rall orga nizationa l neglect by se nior lea dership. his wa s com pounded a fter , as the e nd of t he nationa l origins quota sy stem and exemption of imme diate relative s of .. citizens from per-country caps under the mmig ration and ational ity ct of inc rease d the case loa d age nts were ex pected to take on. he ervice wa s not partic ularly we ll-equippe d for these cha lle nges, whethe r in terms of a dminist ration or employee morale. n , ieute na nt ene ral oseph wing , then ommissioner, ha d pushe d through a pla n to decent ralize the ervice, creating “small replicas” of the hea dquarte rs a nd le ading to the “overlapping and duplicating of functions.” his ha d extremely negativ e impacts for agent s of t he erv ice; many “employes, [sic] mostly vetera n workers,” who did not wa nt to eithe r cha nge their work habits or relocate to new offices, “applied for retireme nt,” and themove in ge ne ral wa s “disp leasing to…em ployes [ sic].” his mora le crisis remained a feature of t he erv ice’s operations throughout the rest of it s existe nce. espite the mixe d re sults of the peration, the , and t he afte reffects of bot h, these ex perience s left a mark on the practices of the age ncy, to which we wil l return below.
The lack of results the Service was able to deliver were also partly the result of a massive, 
persistent crisis of morale among employees, which in turn compounded ill-thought out 
bureaucratic structures.  The INS was (understandably) a broadly unpopular agency and morale 
was generally low, even among senior officers like Castillo.  The agency frequently found itself 
“under attack from all sides,” and faced allegations that it was not “doing enough to exclude 
illegal…aliens” while others charged that it was “insensitive to immigrants.”114  Agency officials 
had to defend district offices from accusations of harassment against non-white immigrants, 
including African students, and news coverage of the INS tended to be negative in tone.115  Low 
morale in the agency was not solely caused by the failures to deport Nazis.  In general, it seems 
that INS employees were deeply unhappy in the organization; the New York Times claimed that 
“dozens of career…employees of the [INS] in three states indicate that many have lost their 
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motivation” because senior leadership, including Commissioner Castillo, was “unconcerned” 
with enforcing the law in general (though in this case specifically referring to undocumented 
Mexican immigrants).116   
Among Service agents specifically concerned with Nazi hunting, even employees who 
did not believe in a cover-up, morale was even lower.  Vincent Schiano, a former INS lawyer 
who testified before Congress, detailed how during the “prosecution of…these cases,” he and his 
fellow employees “felt oppressed.  We were denied a telephone, an office, any funding or even 
courtesies…For two of us to occupy that office, one of us would have to climb over the desk.”  
He could not say whether he “considered it a comedy or tragedy.”117  Upon hearing the news that 
the new Special Litigation Unit had been awarded a budget of some $2.6 million, he 
“confess[ed] to a certain envy.  The budget [fellow lawyer] Tony DeVito and I enjoyed was 
more like $2.6 (sic), expended mostly for coffee and doughnuts for the visiting press.”118  
DeVito’s own morale sunk so low that he fell into fanciful, almost feverish conspiracy theories 
which were explicitly debunked by coworkers but adopted by journalists and authors in book-
length works on this period.119  This was hardly an environment in which Service employees 
investigating Nazi war criminals would feel supported and able to perform their duties to the best 
of their abilities. 
Another difficulty facing INS investigators, and which also negatively impacted 
employee morale, was that the entire process seemed futile.  Even in the limited number of cases 
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where war criminals had been identified and placed in proceedings, the likelihood of 
denaturalization was low, and of deportation even lower.  The subject matter itself was of course 
depressing; employees found it “draining to work…on an issue as overwhelming…as the 
Holocaust.”120  But beyond the gloomy topic of their work, INS investigators and prosecutors 
felt themselves to be “doomed to failure.”121  As mentioned above, investigating tips required 
interagency cooperation, not something to be taken for granted in the provincial world of the 
federal bureaucracy.  Archives in other countries, particularly the Soviet Union, were either 
inaccessible or viewed by the State Department with suspicion.  Agreements between the INS 
and State to formalize procedures for investigators traveling to the Soviet Union were not 
honored.  Supervisors and political appointees in the Department of Justice, for their part, 
preferred that “a formal request to the Soviet Government [sic] await the definite scheduling of 
trial dates” in individual cases—an obvious Catch-22 since important archives and potential 
witnesses were located in the Soviet Union and could not be accessed without such a request.122 
The Service was never truly equipped to investigate the collaborator population itself at 
any kind of scale.  Charles R. Allen, Jr., for instance, pointed to the fact that the Nazi war 
criminal problem was much broader than previously understood, with much higher numbers of 
potential criminals present in the United States.  In his testimony before Congress, he stated that 
most investigations left out “anything above field grade officers from the Wehrmacht…[and] 
many of the prominent influences in the Nazi circles, the Nazi Party, the SS, and the government, 
foreign offices, the educational system or industry, and banking leaders of the Third Reich who 
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have been so used since the end of World War II.”123  Allen highlighted that up to 1979, there 
had only been around 149 investigations, a vanishingly small number given the size of the influx 
of Germans in the postwar period, many of whom had been deeply embedded in a regime 
founded upon genocide and murder.  The INS’s efforts to defend itself in the face of 
Congressional pressure also testify to the paltry numbers of investigations.  Commissioner 
Castillo, in front of the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, 
identified only 43 ongoing investigations, 22 preliminary reports, and others elsewhere in the 
pipeline for a total of 103 cases in an effort to show that the INS had in fact been pulling its 
weight.124  INS employees, including Vincent Schiano, who had been with the INS for a total of 
18 years and worked on Nazi investigations frequently, “was not aware of how many there 
were,” referring even to the limited number above.125  As mentioned above, this was not even 
close to the number of official tips the INS had received, many of which languished on the desk 
of clerks in the regional offices across the United States.  The Service had never been prepared to 
accommodate the actual numbers of individuals needing investigation, and this would remain the 
case until Congress removed their responsibility for this task.   
In cases where investigators were able to surmount these difficulties, they still faced 
massive legal hurdles in prosecuting collaborators, which led to corresponding morale issues and 
feelings on the part of investigators that cases were not worth the time.  In part this was because 
each case was really two cases: denaturalization, in which immigration fraud had to be proven by 
“clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence;” and the deportation proceeding, involving 
contacts with foreign and often semi-hostile governments and raising substantial due process 
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concerns.126  As Allen A. Ryan, Jr., hardly someone with an interest in portraying the INS in a 
good light, put it, these cases held little to recommend themselves to investigators.  INS lawyers 
were not “willing to put in the time” necessary to adequately investigate these cases, in which 
outcomes were far from assured. Furthermore, accolades and raises depended on results rather 
than morality.  “INS investigators, and their supervisors…were not interested in protecting 
Nazis; they were interested in protecting their jobs, and this meant producing results in the cases 
assigned to them.  Nazi cases were unpromising, unfamiliar, and uncertain.”127  Demoralized 
employees looking out for their own career interests, with little support from supervisors, 
expertise in their task, or resources with which to conduct their search were hardly placed in the 
best possible position to investigate alleged Nazi war criminals.  If the few cases which actually 
came across the desks of investigators like Schiano and DeVito faced these kinds of obstacles, 
why bother pushing for an investigation of the problem at its true scale and pursing 
investigations of thousands of people? 
 And in fact, the effort to investigate these thousands was hampered by a focus on millions 
of a different group of people: Mexican migrants.  In the period following the Second World 
War, the Service’s overwhelming priority was to prevent the unlawful migration of Mexican 
nationals and to police those already in the country.  Operation Wetback was one element of this 
policy program, but it included the Bracero Program and the criminalization of the southern 
border in the 1960s and onward.  From 1942 until 1964, the Bracero Program involved the 
importation of “unskilled” farm labor to work in agriculture in the border states during and after 
the Second World War.  The Program consumed a huge amount of Service resources, both in 
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administration of the Program itself and in managing the political minefield that it generated.128  
In fact, nearly all efforts at reform of the Service after the war centered on the southern border; 
Commissioner Swing was specifically hired to revamp enforcement, much to the chagrin of both 
southern agriculturalists and labor organizations which depended on migrant laborers.129   
After the end of both the Bracero Program and Operation Wetback, enforcement priorities 
shifted from enforcing labor discipline into drug interdiction.  In President Nixon’s Operation 
Intercept, for example, the Border Patrol stopped every entrant, whether on foot or traveling by 
vehicle, to search for drugs; “[b]y the early 1970s, [Service employees] reported that the line 
between drug interdiction and migration control had become almost too difficult to decipher.”  
The comingling of Mexican nationality with the category of “illegal immigrant” in the minds of 
Border Patrol agents, which then was conflated with “drug smugglers,” led the Service to view 
all Mexican migrants as targets for enforcing drug laws.130  In the aftermath of the Bracero 
Program and Operation Wetback, the Service focused heavily on this vision of “law 
enforcement,” and its overwhelming emphasis on policing the southern border, controlling 
Mexican migration, and administering the government’s drug war left little resources for other 
efforts, including investigating Nazi war criminals. 
It is in this last regard that the parallels between denazification in Germany and the search for 
collaborators and war criminals in the United States becomes most clear.  Germans (and 
occupiers) who opposed a thorough denazification program did so in large part because a true 
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reckoning with the immediate past would have destabilized what remained of Germany’s 
administrative apparatus.  Business leaders, water sanitation system managers, railway logistics 
engineers, teachers, civil servants, and others would have been purged if denazification had been 
carried out to the extent justice demanded.  The basic foundation of German society and 
subsistence could have been threatened.  Similarly, the INS and its legislative allies believed that 
a failure to adequately police the southern border and prevent the entry of Mexican migrants 
would have led to massive demographic shifts, threatening the basis of America as they knew it.  
The Bracero Program was implemented on the basis of contract labor explicitly because it 
allowed growers to exploit Mexican labor and then return them to their own country afterward, 
preventing them from integrating into American society and polluting the American racial 
makeup.131  The INS viewed unregulated crossing of the border as a major threat, including it 
alongside alien saboteurs as their most important tasks during World War II.132  In the world of 
postwar immigration enforcement, and in the eyes of the INS, Mexican migration to the United 
States represented a bigger threat to the underpinnings of American society than did the presence 
of Nazi collaborators and war criminals. 
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 In this thesis I have attempted to accomplish two things: to provide a historiographical 
synthesis of works on Nazi war criminals in the United States and denazification in Germany; 
and to provide a more accurate account of why collaborators in the United States were able to 
live their lives in America unmolested and, for the vast majority, to escape justice.  In doing so I 
have also attempted to demonstrate that the scale of this failure is far vaster than previously 
estimated, and provided some additional arguments specifically related to this fact.  In my 
investigation of the existing historiography, I noted that works on Nazi war criminals in the 
United States have tended to adopt what I call a “Paperclip approach,” centering on the historical 
narrative surrounding Operation Paperclip and applying it to cases where it does not fit the facts.  
They have also tended to attribute the failure to investigate collaborators to America’s Cold War 
anticommunism, even in cases where this does not logically apply.  This has led to scholarship 
on collaborators in the United States, for the most part, to read as conspiratorial, and to provide 
borderline sensational narratives.  As a corrective, I have attempted to show that works on 
denazification in Germany provide a more instructive template.  These have focused less on Cold 
War politics and the overlap between U.S. military-industrial organizations and Nazis than on 
the more mundane reasons why denazification failed, including the need for administrative 
stability, the extremely complex politics of denazification, general disdain for programs imposed 
upon Germans by occupying powers, and administrative and logistical challenges of 
investigating and prosecuting potentially millions of people. 
 Moving past these two historiographical traditions, I have attempted to provide an 
alternative explanation for the failure of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to 
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investigate and prosecute Nazi war criminals living in the United States.  Relying on testimonies 
before Congress, newspaper interviews with various outlets, accounts of investigative journalists, 
and several groundbreaking scholarly works which relied upon innovative use of archival 
sources, I have attempted to show that the INS failed to prosecute Nazi war criminals for reasons 
as prosaic as organizational dysfunction, lack of resources, morale crises within the agency, and 
an institutional focus on enforcing racist immigration policies on the U.S.-Mexico border.  
Furthermore, this story reveals that administering justice and determining who deserved 
punishment in the wake of humanity’s greatest catastrophe was perhaps an insurmountable task 
from the start, even if those charged with conducting the investigation had been competent, 
driven, and focused, which was regrettably not the case. 
 Allen A. Ryan, Jr. summed up the importance of this story best in his Quiet Neighbors: 
“we have never known how to deal with Nazi war criminals in this country, and so our actions 
have been marked by ambivalence and equivocation.”133  In the hunt for international 
lawbreakers, failure is less attributable to malice than to sloth, incompetence, lack of focus, and 
indecision.  Where the search proved to be difficult, it was abandoned.  Applied to our own time, 
we learn from the INS’s failures from 1945 to 1979 that to root out and end the excesses and 
failures of the immigration and criminal justice systems, it is not conspiracies that we must 
attack, but bureaucratic inertia and inactivism. 
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